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Abstract: Lottery-choice experiments are conducted to compare risk preferences revealed by 
three-person groups versus isolated individuals.  A lottery-choice experiment consists of a menu 
of paired lottery choices structured so that the crossover point from a low-risk to a high-risk 
lottery can be used to infer the degree of risk aversion.  A between-subjects experiment of group 
versus individual lottery-choice decisions reveal that there is not a significant difference in the 
average crossover point, but lottery choices are affected by a significant interaction between 
subject composition (individual or group) and lottery winning percentage.  Also, a three-phased 
individual-group-individual sequenced experiment reveals that the count of safe lotteries chosen 
by groups is, on average, significantly greater than the mean of the individual members.  Finally, 
making a phase-two group decision has a significant impact on subsequent phase-three individual 
decisions relative to the initial phase-one (individual) decisions. 
   2
Comparing Small-Group and Individual Behavior in Lottery-Choice Experiments 
 
    Group decision-making plays an important role in economic policy.  From the Open 
Market Committee of the Federal Reserve to family expenditures, important decisions are made 
by groups.  While there is a long history in social psychology of studying the effects of group 
discussion on decision making, research addressing when and how group decisions differ from 
individual decisions in economic contexts with salient cash rewards  has only recently appeared 
in the economics literature.  This study builds on this nascent literature by reporting the results of 
a series of lottery-choice experiments.  The goal of this study is to compare the risk preferences of 
three-person groups and individuals in an environment where group members must unanimously 
agree on the group decision after a period of unstructured discussion.
1  In a lottery-choice 
experiment, subjects choose between playing two lotteries, one “safe” (little monetary difference 
in lottery payoffs) and one “risky” (large monetary difference in lottery payoffs), with varying 
probabilities of reaching the higher monetary lottery payoff.  A subject’s risk preference is 
inferred by examining the number of safe lottery choices and comparing them to the risk-neutral 
benchmark of choosing the lottery with the highest expected monetary payoff for all probabilities.   
  The main findings of this study are as follows.  1) The non-sequenced (between-subjects) 
experiments generating independent individual-choice and group-choice samples do not show a 
significant difference in the total number of safe-lottery choices based on subject composition 
(individual or group decision makers); however, lottery choice is affected by a significant 
interaction between subject composition and the lottery winning percentage, defined here as the 
probability of attaining the high-payoff outcome in the lottery.  2) The sequenced individual-
                                                 
1 See Kerr, MacCoun, and Kramer (1996) for an excellent review of the social psychology literature on 
group versus individual decision making.  This experimental literature is primarily based on choice-
dilemma questionnaires where subjects made decisions based on hypothetical situations in the absence of a 
salient reward structure.  Kerr et al. concluded “there are several demonstrations that group discussion can 
attenuate, amplify, or simply reproduce the judgmental biases of individuals” and “research conducted to 
date indicates that there is unlikely to be any simple, global answer to the question (p. 693).”  An excellent 
summary of the small pre-2005 economics literature on group versus individual decision making is 
contained in Kocher and Sutter (2005). 
   3
group-individual (within-subjects) experiments show that the total number of safe-lottery choices 
by groups is significantly greater than the mean total safe choices of group members.  3) 
Participating in phase-two group discussion significantly impacts the subsequent phase-three 
individual decisions relative to the phase-one individual decisions.  4) As in the between-subjects 
experiments, lottery choices in the sequenced experiments are affected by a significant interaction 
between subject composition and lottery winning percentage. 
  The paper proceeds as follows:  Section 2 summarizes recent related research exploring 
risk preferences of individuals and groups using lottery-valuation or lottery-choice experiments; 
the experimental procedures for the lottery-choice experiments utilized here are explained in 
Section 3; Section 4 presents the experimental results; and a summary of conclusions is offered in 
Section 5. 
Section 2: Overview of Recent Related Lottery Experiments 
  Recent studies using lotteries to elicit risk preferences have been conducted by Holt and 
Laury (2002), Harrison, Lau et al. (2005), Colombier et al. (2006), and Shupp and Williams 
(2008).  Holt and Laury elicited individual risk preferences using a four-phase lottery-choice 
experiment with probabilities of obtaining the higher monetary payoff ranging from 10% to 
100%.  Each phase differed by the monetary payoffs of the lotteries and whether or not subjects 
were paid based on their decisions.
2  Their experimental results showed that subject decisions at 
baseline payoff levels were consistent with risk aversion (indicated by the number of safe lottery 
choices), there was no difference in inferred risk preferences between baseline payoffs and high-
hypothetical payoffs, and the magnitude of inferred risk aversion increased from baseline to high-
real payoffs.  Increased risk aversion persisted as the payoffs continued to be scaled upward; 
however, risk preferences in the high-payoff lotteries were not consistent with those in the 
hypothetical high-payoff lotteries.  Finally, risk preferences in baseline-payoff lotteries conducted 
                                                 
2 Monetary payoffs for the baseline treatment were $3.85 and $0.10 for the risky lottery and $2.00 and 
$1.60 for the safe lottery.  Payoffs were scaled by factors of 20, 50 and 90 from the baseline levels.   4
after the high-payoff lottery phase remained consistent with the baseline-payoff lotteries 
conducted prior to the high-payoff lottery phase.   
  In a comment on the Holt and Laury (2002) paper, Harrison, Johnson et al. (2005) noted 
that an order effect existed in the Holt-Laury lottery-choice experiments.  Holt and Laury (2005) 
reported new data to address the magnitude of the order effect; their original conclusions were 
supported by the new data. 
Harrison, Lau et al. (2005) analyzed social preferences in a lottery-choice experiment.  
Individuals were assigned to anonymous three-person groups and the group decision was 
determined by majority rule.  Group members were not allowed to communicate with one 
another.  Controlling for order effects and subject demographics, the interval regression and 
random-effects panel-data estimates reported found no evidence of differences in the choices of 
individuals and three-person majority-rule groups. 
Shupp and Williams (2008) conducted lottery-valuation experiments to compare the risk 
preferences revealed by individuals relative to three-person groups and to analyze how individual 
decisions are aggregated to form a group decision.  Instead of using a lottery-choice procedure, 
Shupp and Williams elicited maximum willingness-to-pay bids to play each of nine lotteries with 
varying probabilities (10% to 90%) of winning $20 ($60 for groups) or nothing.  Individuals were 
endowed with $20 (groups with $60) to cover their bids.  Group decisions were formed by 
unanimous consent after an unstructured period of face-to-face discussion.      
  Shupp and Williams analyzed their results using a certainty-equivalent ratio (CER) 
defined as the reported maximum willingness to pay divided by the expected value of the lottery.  
Thus a CER = 1 was consistent with risk-neutral preferences, a CER > 1 was consistent with risk-
seeking preferences, and CER < 1 was consistent with risk-averse preferences.  For example, in a 
lottery with a 50% probability of winning $20, the expected value of the lottery is $10.  If a 
subject reported a maximum willingness to pay of $10, this person would be classified as risk 
neutral (with a CER of 1).  In contrast, if a subject reported a maximum willingness to pay of $7   5
(less than the expected value of the lottery) this person would be classified as risk averse (with a 
CER of 0.7).  Elicited CERs showed a significant interaction between subject composition 
(individual or group) and the lottery win percentage.  For the lowest-risk lotteries (win percentage 
of at least 80%) the average group CER was near the risk-neutral benchmark and slightly greater 
than the average individual CER.  For the highest-risk lotteries (win percentage of at most 40%) 
the average group CER revealed substantial risk aversion and was significantly smaller than the 
average individual CER.  For lotteries with a winning percentage of 50%-70%, average group and 
individual CERs were consistent with risk aversion and not significantly different.   
  Shupp and Williams also conducted a follow-up experiment employing individual-then-
group sequenced decisions that was designed to test the robustness of their initial (independent 
samples) results and to explore how individuals form a group decision.  These data confirmed that 
group discussion led to a significant shift of the group CER away from the mean individual 
group-member CER toward more risk aversion in the four highest-risk lotteries.  No significant 
individual-versus-group difference was found in the five lowest-risk lotteries. 
  In a recent working paper, Colombier, et al. (2006) report individual and three-person 
group lottery-choice experiments where group members can not directly communicate, as in 
Harrison, Lau, et al. (2005), but must come to a unanimous group decision through an iterative 
voting process or have a random decision imposed on the group.  They interpret their results as 
being inconsistent with the findings of Harrison, Lau et al. (2005) (significant differences are 
reported for individual versus group decisions) and generally consistent with implications derived 
from the Shupp-Williams lottery-valuation research and the research reported here. 
Section 3: Experimental Procedures 
  The experimental procedure followed Holt and Laury (2002), Holt and Laury (2005), and 
Laury (2002).  Subjects were presented with a menu of ten lottery-choice decisions.  Each 
decision represented a choice between a relatively “safe” lottery (with a small difference between 
the low-payoff and high-payoff outcome) and a more “risky” lottery (with a larger difference   6
between the low-payoff and high-payoff outcome).  Payoffs were identical in all 10 decisions, 
however the probability of the high-payoff outcome increased in 10% increments from 10% in 
the first decision to 100% in the last decision.  In each decision, the subject was asked to choose 
which lottery he preferred to play.  One of these decisions was randomly chosen for payment by 
throwing a ten-sided die, with the outcome of the lottery determined by a second throw.  
Instructions and decision sheets are included in the Appendix.  
As in Holt and Laury (2002), the total number of safe lottery choices was used as a 
measurement of subject risk preferences.  A subject acting as if risk-neutral would choose the 
lottery with the highest expected monetary payoff for all winning probabilities: he would choose 
the safe lottery for winning probabilities  %] 40 %, 10 [ ∈ p and then switch to the risky lottery for 
the winning probabilities %] 100 %, 50 [ ∈ p .
3  A subject acting as if risk averse would choose the 
safe lottery for ] % 10 [ M , p∈  where M > 40%.  A subject acting as if risk seeking would choose 
the safe lottery for ] % 10 [ M , p∈ where M < 40%.   
  In each session subjects participated in either an individual-choice task or a group-choice 
task (or both).  In the individual-choice task, subjects were seated in a lab and were visually 
isolated from one another when they made their lottery-choice decisions.  In the group-choice 
task, each group (consisting of three subjects) was placed into a separate room near the lab to 
ensure that between-group communication did not occur.  Subjects were told to reach a 
unanimous decision for all group choices.  They indicated their agreement with the group choices 
by signing a statement sheet.  If subjects could not reach a unanimous agreement, they were told a 
majority rule would be used in determining the group decision.  However, all groups were able to 
reach a consensus and the majority rule was never used.
4  
                                                 
3 The risk-neutral set of lottery choices is optimal for risk preferences in the interval of (-0.15,0.15) for the 
Constant Relative Risk Aversion model with utility for money x of  . ) (
1 r x x u
− =  
4 Knowing that a majority rule would be used in case of disagreement, subjects could have invoked this rule 
on their own to make their group decisions.  In fact, 142 of 150 (94.7%) group decisions in phase 2 of the 
sequenced experiment are consistent with a majority rule according to group members’ choices in phase 1.   7
  All sessions were conducted at Georgia State University, the same subject population 
used in Holt and Laury (2002). 
The results from two treatments are reported here.  In the first treatment, data generated 
from a between-subjects design are examined: 30 subjects completed the individual-choice task 
only and 45 subjects (15 groups) completed the group-choice task only.  In the second treatment, 
sequenced data from a within-subjects design are examined: 45 subjects participated in an 
individual-choice task, followed by a group-choice task, and then a final individual-choice task.  
These two treatments are summarized in Table 1 and are described below. 
3.A: Non-Sequenced Treatment 
In the individual-task sessions
5 (Ind 10X), subjects entered the lab and were seated at 
individual desks.  They started by completing a hypothetical trial lottery-choice task with 
different payoffs than those used in the actual experiment in order to become familiar with the 
procedures.
6  Next, they completed ten lottery-choice decisions; payoffs were ten-times those 
used in the baseline Holt and Laury treatment.  The payoffs for the safe option (labeled “Option 
A” on the decision-sheet) were $20 or $16, while the payoffs from the risky option (labeled 
“Option B”) were $38.50 or $1.   Table 2 displays the expected value for each lottery used in this 
treatment. 
In the group-task sessions (Group 10X), subjects entered the experimental laboratory and 
were seated at individual desks.  Each desk contained a post-it note with a number on it.  Subjects 
were later told that the number represented the group they would participate with during the 
session.  The desks were numbered such that subjects seated next to each other were placed in 
different groups in order to minimize the probability that friends would be placed in the same 
group. 
                                                 
5 The individual-task sessions were completed approximately one year prior the group-task sessions.  The 
individual-task data were originally analyzed in Laury (2002). 
6 Option A was $3 with certainty and Option B was either $6 or $1.   8
As in the individual-task sessions, all subjects first participated in a hypothetical trainer 
task to familiarize them with the procedures.  Next, subjects broke into groups to complete the 
menu of lottery choices.  All payoffs were three-times higher than in the individual-choice task, 
and subjects were told that the earnings would be equally divided among all three group members 
(so that individual payoffs were identical to those in the individual-choice task).  As in the other 
treatments, subjects were told that just one of the ten lotteries would be randomly chosen ex post 
for payment.  When a group returned from making their choices, a ten-sided die was rolled twice 
to determine the played lottery and the lottery outcome.   
3.B: Sequenced Treatment 
A sequenced individual-group-individual (sequenced IGI) treatment was also performed.  
The payoffs in this treatment were identical to the Holt and Laury baseline payoff level; as in the 
non-sequenced group sessions, the group’s payoff was three-times higher than the individual 
payoff so that the individual payoffs were identical between group and individual tasks.    Table 3 
displays the expected value for all ten lotteries in this treatment.  As in the non-sequenced 
sessions, all tasks were preceded by a hypothetical lottery choice task that trained subjects on the 
procedures. 
  The sequenced IGI experiment consisted of three phases.  Subjects were not told about 
any future tasks until they took place and did not know in advance how many decision-making 
tasks would be completed during the experiment.  In phase 1 subjects first made lottery choices 
individually in the experimental laboratory.  In phase 2 subjects then repeated the experiment as 
part of a randomly composed three-person group.
7  After completing the experiment as a group, 
subjects returned to the experimental laboratory and again repeated the experiment individually in 
phase 3.  After subjects completed all three phases, a ten-sided die was rolled for each group and 
individual to determine the lottery outcomes for each phase.  Payoffs were determined in this way 
                                                 
7 Like the non-sequenced sessions, subjects were assigned to groups based on the number on the post-it 
note on their desk. 
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to control for wealth effects (e.g. the phase 2 decision was not affected by the monetary outcome 
from the phase 1 decision).    
Section 4: Experimental Results 
  The experimental results are analyzed in the following ways.  First, the impact of subject 
demographics (e.g. race, gender, etc.) on individual lottery-choice decisions is examined.  If 
demographics play an important role in explaining differences in individual decisions, then group 
composition should be taken into account when studying group decisions.  To examine the role of 
subject demographics, a count-data Poisson regression model is estimated using the individual 
10X (Ind 10X) and phase 1 sequenced IGI data, where the count of safe-lottery choices is the 
dependent variable.  Second, group and individual decisions from the non-sequenced between-
subjects treatment are compared for differences in the total number of safe lottery choices through 
a count-data regression.  Further, the potential interaction between subject composition and 
lottery win percentage found by Shupp and Williams (2008) is investigated via a clustered-logit 
regression using the binary lottery choice (safe or risky) as the dependent variable.  Finally, the 
results from the sequenced IGI experiment are examined to explore how individual decisions are 
aggregated to form a group decision and the impact of group decisions on subsequent individual 
lottery-choice decisions. 
4.A: Subject Demographics 
  Demographic information was gathered by having subjects complete a survey following 
the lottery-choice experiment.  Demographic effects are measured by a Poisson regression model 
using data from the Ind 10X experiment and phase 1 of the sequenced IGI experiment.
8  The 
dependent variable is the count of safe lottery choices, which serves as an indicator of risk 
preference.
9,10  The independent variables include dummies for Ind 10X, race (white=1, other=0), 
                                                 
8 See Cameron and Trivedi (2005, Chapter 20) and Long (1997, Chapter 8) for details on the Poisson 
regression model. 
9 Of course, decision errors or motivations other than maximization of expected utility from lottery payoffs 
could influence lottery choices.  For example, subjects might derive some nonmonetary utility from the   10
gender (male=1, female=0), income (low income of less than $5,000=1, income at least 
$5,000=0), student status (undergraduate=1, graduate=0), and major (mathematical=1, else=0).
11  
Table 4 displays the regression results.  A convenient way to interpret the regression coefficients 
in the Poisson model is to examine incidence-rate ratios (IRR), where
i e
β = IRR .  IRRs reveal the 
percentage change in the expected count of the number of safe lottery choices due to a change in 
the treatment condition, holding all other independent variables constant.  For example, in Table 
4, the Ind 10X treatment changes the expected frequency of safe lottery choices by a multiple of 
0.992 compared to the phase 1 sequenced IGI treatment, a 0.8% decrease [i.e. 100*(IRR – 1)].  
The null hypothesis of the data having a Poisson distribution is not rejected according to 
Pearson’s chi-square goodness-of-fit test (p = 0.9886).  Further, the overall regression is not 
significant (p = 0.7786).  Thus, subject demographics are not likely to explain differences in the 
number of safe lotteries chosen by individuals.  Also of interest, the regression does not support 
the payoff effect (larger lottery payoffs induce more risk aversion) found in the Holt and Laury 
(2002) experiments.  Raising the relatively small baseline lottery payoffs by a factor of 10 is 
apparently insufficient to raise inferred risk aversion levels in subjects. 
4.B: Non-Sequenced Treatment 
Table 5 and Figure 1 summarize the results of the Group 10X and Ind 10X lottery-choice 
experiments.  The Group 10X data offers a cleaner picture of risk preferences than the Ind 10X 
data in that no group switches back to the safe lottery once they choose a risky lottery.  Table 5 
shows the average number of safe choices of both Ind 10X and Group 10X to be greater than 
four, the number consistent with risk-neutral preferences, with the Group 10X choices exhibiting 
                                                                                                                                                 
excitement of playing the risky lottery or from submitting choices that would please the experimenter.  
Furthermore, the effects of such anomalies might not be symmetric across individuals and groups. 
10 All results are also supported using only data where subjects made choices with a single switch point 
from the safe to the risky lottery.  Four of 30 subjects in Ind 10X and nine of 45 subjects in phase 1 
sequenced IGI submitted choices that contained more than one switch point and thus were not consistent 
with expected utility theory. 
11 Subjects majoring in a mathematical based discipline are more likely to be exposed to calculating 
expected values and using these calculations to guide their lottery-choice decisions.  Mathematical majors 
considered here are Business, Accounting, Management, Marketing, Math, Economics, Risk Management, 
Engineering, and MBA students.   11
slightly lower dispersion.  This observation is confirmed by a sign test (p < 0.01) for both Ind 
10X and Group 10X.  A Poisson regression model is again used to examine variation in the 
number of safe-lottery choices, which is the dependent variable.  The independent variables are 
dummies indicating Ind 10X and phase 2 sequenced IGI observations, where the latter captures 
the joint effect in the group-choice data of changing payoffs and any pure-sequencing effect 
associated with phase 2 decisions. The results of this regression are displayed in Table 6.  The 
null hypothesis of the data having a Poisson distribution is not rejected by the Pearson chi-square 
goodness-of-fit test (p = 0.9635).  The overall regression is not significant (p = 0.966).  Therefore, 
there is no significant difference in total safe-lottery choices between groups and individuals and 
no payoff/sequencing effect for groups.
12 
Although, on average, there is no significant difference in the total count of safe-lottery 
choices, Figure 1 indicates a possible interaction effect of subject composition and lottery 
winning percentage on the probability of choosing the safe lottery.  Even though the percentage 
of groups choosing the safe lottery is higher than the percentage of individuals in the 50%-60% 
lotteries, fewer groups than individuals deviate from the choice consistent with risk-neutral 
preferences in the highest-risk (10%-30%) and lowest-risk (80%-100%) lotteries.  This possible 
interaction is similar to Shupp and Williams (2008) and Colombier et al. (2006).  Recall the 
finding of Shupp and Williams that group CERs were significantly lower than individual CERs in 
the lotteries with the lowest winning percentages (highest risk).  For the highest winning-
percentage (lowest-risk) lotteries, group CERs approached risk neutrality.
13 Colombier et al. 
(2006) also find a greater percentage of groups choose the safe lottery than individuals in the 
50%-60% lotteries, consistent with more risk-averse preferences relative to individuals for those 
                                                 
12 This result is also supported by a Wilcoxon rank-sum test (p = 0.885) using the total safe lottery choices 
of a subject as an observation. 
13 It must be noted that willingness to pay (WTP) differentials may exist between groups and individuals in 
this study, but are not captured by the lottery-choice method.  Assuming a safe lottery choice means WTP 
safe > WTP risky, groups and individuals could have significant differences in WTP, but choose the same 
lottery.  Holding the CER fixed across the lottery choices would result in choices consistent with risk-
neutral preferences in this study no matter whether the CER is consistent with risk-averse or risk-preferring 
preferences.     12
lotteries.  When the lottery winning percentage is further increased, group choices are more 
consistent with risk neutrality than individuals.    
To investigate the relationship between subject composition and lottery winning 
percentage, a logit regression is performed using the binary indicator of a safe choice as the 
dependent variable (safe=1, risky=0) with the independent variables consisting of a subject 
composition dummy (group=1, individual=0), the lottery winning percentage, and an interaction 
term.  To account for the lack of independence across the ten lottery choices made by each 
individual or group, clustered-robust standard errors are utilized.
14  For the logit regression to be 
consistent with Figure 1, the coefficient on the lottery winning percentage is expected to be 
negative, because Figure 1 shows the average number of safe-lottery choices decreasing as the 
lottery winning percentage increases.  The coefficient on the interaction term is expected to be 
negative. A negative interaction coefficient suggests that, as the winning-percentage increases, 
groups are less likely than individuals to choose the safe lottery.  Finally, Figure 1 does not imply 
any specific sign on the group-decision dummy variable. 
  Table 7 presents the results of the clustered-logit regression.  The regression coefficients 
match their expected signs, and all independent variables are significant.  To further explain how 
the independent variables influence the probability of choosing the safe lottery, Figure 2 displays 
the regression’s predicted probability of choosing the safe lottery for different values of the 
independent variables.  To examine whether the predicted probabilities for the group-interaction 
line are significantly different than the predicted probabilities for the individual line, a Wald test 
is conducted.  The joint null hypothesis is that both the group dummy and interaction regression 
coefficients equal zero.  The null hypothesis is rejected (p = 0.018) indicating that, similar to 
                                                 
14 For a detailed discussion of the heteroskedasticity-robust Huber/White sandwich estimator of variance in 
clustered samples see, for example, Cameron and Trivedi (2005, Chapter 24, Section 24.5).  The specific 
implementation utilized here is documented in Rogers (1993).   13
Shupp and Williams (2008), a significant interaction between group-versus-individual decision 
making and lottery winning percentage exists.
15   
4.C: Sequenced Individual-Group-Individual Treatment 
  In order to examine how individual decisions are aggregated to form a group decision and 
if interacting in a group immediately impacts subsequent individual decisions, a sequenced 
individual-group-individual experiment was conducted.  The results from the sequenced 
experiment also offer a robustness check on the results from the non-sequenced experiment. 
  Figure 3 and Table 8 summarize the results of the sequenced IGI experiment.  Again the 
group data is “cleaner” in that all groups submit choices that are consistent with expected utility 
theory in the sense that there is a unique switch point from the safe to the risky lottery.
16  Sign 
tests in each phase of the sequenced experiment (phase 1: p = 0.0025, phase 2: p = 0.0010, phase 
3: p = 0.0000) indicate that subject choices in the sequenced experiment are, on average, 
consistent with risk aversion. 
The analysis now turns to comparing the lottery decisions across each phase.  Table 9 
displays the number of safe choices for each group member and the mean number of safe choices 
of group members in phases 1 and 3, as well as the phase 2 group number of safe choices.  
Comparing phases 1 and 2, ten of fifteen groups choose more safe lotteries than the mean of its 
members, two groups choose fewer safe lotteries than their member mean, and three groups 
choose the same number of safe lotteries as their member mean.  A Wilcoxon signed-ranks 
matched-pairs test rejects the null hypothesis of equal population counts of safe choices between 
the phase-1 group-member mean and the phase-2 group decision (p = 0.0342).
17,18 
                                                 
15 Significant differences for specific lottery pairings were examined via binomial tests and 95% confidence 
bands around logit predicted probabilities.  Given the small sample sizes, the null of homogeneity between 
group and individual safe choices can not be rejected in 8 of 10 lotteries. 
16 Only 3 of 45 individuals in phase 3 submitted choices that were not consistent with expected utility 
theory, compared with 9 of 45 individuals in phase 1.  The group discussion in phase 2 appears to increase 
the likelihood of individuals submitting a unique switch point.  
17 After subjects interact in phase-2 groups it can not be assumed that the phase-3 individual decisions 
represent independent observations.  Thus, matched-pairs tests employing phase-3 data are not reported.    14
Figure 3 illustrates that phase-3 individual decisions appear to gravitate toward the phase-
2 group decisions.  To more formally examine the potential impact of group decisions on group 
members’ subsequent individual decisions, an ordinary least-squares regression is conducted 
where the dependent variable is the change in an individual’s safe-lottery count from phase 1 to 
phase 3 (phase 3 – phase 1).  The independent variable is the difference between an individual’s 
phase-1 safe-lottery count and the relevant group’s safe-lottery count (phase 2 – phase 1).  
Clustered robust standard errors are estimated where clustering is by membership in a specific 
three-person group to account for the lack of independence in group members’ phase-3 decisions 
following verbal interaction in phase 2.  The coefficient of this regression is positive (b = 0.6663) 
and significant (p = 0.001), indicating that each positive difference in the number of safe choices 
the group made in phase 2 from the group member in phase 1 increases the change in the number 
of safe choices made by the group member in phase 3 from phase 1 by 0.67.  Therefore, 
participating in phase 2 has a significant, positive impact on subjects’ safe-lottery choices in 
phase 3.  
Figure 3 also suggests the presence of an interaction effect of subject composition and 
winning percentage on the probability of choosing the safe lottery.  Phase-2 groups appear to be 
deviating from the risk-neutral set of choices less than phase-1 individuals in the lowest and 
highest winning-percentage lotteries, but the reverse is true for the 50%-60% winning-percentage 
lotteries. The clustered-logit regression used to analyze the non-sequenced between-subject data 
is also used to analyze the sequenced within-subject IGI data.  The results appear in Table 10.
19  
The winning-percentage coefficient is significantly negative, the group-decision phase-2 dummy 
coefficient is significantly positive, and the interaction coefficient is significantly negative.  The 
regression’s predicted probabilities of choosing the safe lottery calculated at various values of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
18 The same result is reached using the median as the group member average.  However, it must be noted 
that the Wilcoxon signed-ranks matched-pairs test drops pairs that are equal, which occurs in 6 of the 15 
phase median pairings in phases 1 and 2.  
19 For the sequenced-decisions clustered-logit results to be compared with the non-sequenced results, it is 
assumed that the phase-1 individual decisions and phase-2 group decisions are independent.   15
independent variables are shown in Figure 4.  A Wald test is again conducted to test whether or 
not a significant difference exists between the predicted probabilities shown in the phase-1 line 
and the phase-2 with interaction line.  The joint null hypothesis that the phase-2 dummy and 
interaction regression coefficients equal zero is rejected (p = 0.02).  Therefore, similar to the 
results from the non-sequenced sessions, a significant interaction exists between group-versus-
individual decision making and lottery winning percentage.
20  
Section 5: Summary and Directions for Future Research 
  A lottery-choice experiment introduced by Holt and Laury (2002) is conducted where 
subjects choose between playing two lotteries, one “safe” (little monetary difference in lottery 
payoffs) and one “risky” (large monetary difference in lottery payoffs), with varying probabilities 
of receiving the higher monetary payoff.  A decision maker’s risk preference is inferred by 
comparing the actual count of safe lottery choices to the risk-neutral benchmark of always 
choosing the lottery with the highest expected monetary payoff.  The research reported here 
examines whether three-person group decisions submitted after unstructured discussion among 
group members differ significantly from decisions submitted by isolated individuals.  The 
experimental design also addresses whether making decisions as a group impacts subsequent 
individual behavior.  It is found that, consistent with the results reported in previous experimental 
research, individual lottery-choice decisions tend to exhibit risk aversion as revealed by the count 
of safe lotteries chosen.  This basic risk-aversion result is found to extend to three-person group 
decisions. 
  Using payoff levels ten times the baseline of Holt and Laury (2002), Poisson regression 
analysis reveals that gender, race, educational indicators, and other demographic factors do not 
significantly influence the (nonnegative integer count of) safe-lottery choices by isolated 
individuals.  Independent samples of three-person group versus individual lottery-choice 
decisions compared using Poisson regression reveal that there is not a significant difference in the 
                                                 
20 Again, the null hypothesis of homogeneity between group and individual decisions for specific lottery 
pairings can not be rejected for each of the 10 lotteries.   16
average number of safe lotteries chosen.  However, a logit regression model utilizing clustered-
robust standard errors reveals that the probability of choosing the safe lottery is significantly 
affected by an interaction between subject composition (group or individual) and the lottery 
winning percentage.  Relative frequency plots of safe-lottery choices for each lottery pairing 
illustrate that groups tend to deviate less frequently than individuals from the risk-neutral lottery 
choice in the lowest winning-percentage (10%-30%) lottery pairs (the safe lottery) and the 
highest winning-percentage (80%-100%) lottery pairs (the risky lottery).  However, focusing on 
the small sample of data from a single win-percentage lottery, the difference in safe-lottery choice 
frequency tends not to be statistically significant.  An interaction between subject composition 
and lottery winning percentage was previously reported by Shupp and Williams (2008) using a 
maximum willingness-to-pay risk-preference measure that is quite different than the lottery-
choice procedure utilized here.  In a recent working paper, Colombier, et al. (2006) also interpret 
their lottery-choice experiments as being generally consistent with the results reported by Shupp 
and Williams. 
Data from a three-phased sequenced individual-group-individual experiment reveal that, 
using a Wilcoxon matched-pairs test, the count of safe-lottery choices submitted by three-person 
groups (in phase 2) is significantly greater than the mean of the group members (in phase 1).  
Further, an OLS regression model reveals that participating in the phase-2 unstructured group 
discussion appears to have a significant impact on the subsequent (phase 3) individual group-
member decision relative to the original pre-discussion (phase 1) individual decision.  Post-
discussion individual decisions tend to move toward the group decision.  Finally, consistent with 
the non-sequenced between-subjects data, relative frequency plots supported by a logit regression 
model with robust-clustered standard errors suggest that the phase-1 (individual) and phase-2 
(group) sequenced lottery-choice data are influenced by a significant interaction between subject 
composition (group or individual) and the lottery winning percentage.   17
Further research addressing the existence of risk-preference differentials revealed by 
small-groups versus isolated individuals can address a variety of interesting issues.  Obviously, 
larger sample sizes and careful replication by other researchers using different participant 
populations is always useful to nail down empirical stylized facts.  Beyond pure replication, 
additional sequenced experiments using either a lottery-choice procedure or a lottery willingness-
to-pay elicitation procedure are needed to investigate the existence and importance of pure order 
effects.  In particular, a series of at least three decisions by isolated individuals would be an 
interesting exploration of learning and the stability of various risk-preference measurements.  
Individual choice variation or convergence patterns over time could be contrasted with similar 
experiments using groups of various sizes and various rules for coming to a group decision.  
While sequenced experiments examining individual, group, and subsequent individual or group 
decisions are also important, the independence issues raised for decision data subsequent to 
having participants freely interact in groups are problematic.  Also, it remains to be seen whether 
the payoff-magnitude effects reported by Holt and Laury (2002), where larger payoffs tend to 
result in more risk-averse decisions, will extend to small-groups and risk-preference measurement 
procedures other than the Holt-Laury lottery choice game.   18
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Table 1: Summary of Experimental Sessions 
 






Ind  10X  2  30 $14 $1 $16 
Group 10X  2  45  $24.83  $16  $38.50 
Sequenced IGI  3  45  $6.91  $3.70  $11.55 
Note: An unrelated dictator/charitable giving experiment was conducted after the lottery-choice 
experiment in all sessions.  The amount used in this experiment varied between experimental 
sessions.  The main goal of this additional event was to raise subject earnings in the sequenced 
IGI experiments to the range of those in the Group 10X experiments. 
 






















A  $16.40 $16.80 $17.20 $17.60 $18.00 $18.40 $18.80 $19.20 $19.60  $20 
Choice 



























A  $1.64 $1.68 $1.72 $1.76 $1.80 $1.84 $1.88 $1.92 $1.96 $2.00 
Choice  




Table 4: Poisson Count-Data Regression:  Individual Data 
 





Standard Error  Z  p-value 
ind10x 0.99227  0.116226 -0.07  0.947 
white 1.097571  0.128932  0.79  0.428 
male 0.985219  0.107088 -0.14  0.891 
lowinc 1.02049  0.113529  0.18  0.855 
undergrad 0.840803 0.097382  -1.5  0.134 
mathmajor 0.972362  0.105147  -0.26  0.795 
n = 75, McFadden’s pseudo R
2 = 0.011, Ho: dependent variable is Poisson distributed:  p = 0.989 
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Table 5: Number of safe Lottery Choices 
  
  Individual 10X  Group 10X 
Mean 5.67  5.73 
Median 6  6 
SD 2.12  1.28 
Max 10  8 
Min 0  3 
n 30  15 
 
 
Table 6: Poisson Count-Data Regression Comparing Group and Individual Data 
   





Standard Error  Z  p-value 
Ind10x 0.988372  0.130788  -0.09  0.93 
phase2igi 1.023256 0.155156  0.15  0.879 
n = 60, McFadden’s pseudo R
2 = 0.0003, Ho: dependent variable is Poisson distributed: p = 0.964 
 
 
Table 7: Clustered Logit Regression:  Group 10X and Individual 10X Experiments 
 
Dependent variable: safe=1, risky=0                    
Independent 
Variable 
Coefficient Robust  Clustered 
Standard Error 
Z p-value 
win percentage  -6.3819  1.2450  -5.13  0.000 
group 5.3950  2.1711  2.48  0.013 
interaction -8.6443  3.1477  -2.75  0.006 
constant 3.9727  0.9072  4.38  0.000 
n = 450, McFadden’s pseudo R
2 = 0.4585 
 
 
Table 8: Number of Safe Lottery Choices: Sequenced IGI 
 
  Phase 1  Phase 2  Phase 3 
Mean  5.38 5.87 5.64 
Median  5 6 6 
SD  1.28 0.83 1.09 
Max  8 7 9 
Min  3 4 4 
n  45 15 45 
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1 5 7 5  5.67  6 5 6 4 5 
2 7 6 4  5.67  6 7 6 5 6 
3 4 3 3  3.33  4 5 4 4  4.33 
4 8 4 6 6 6 6 4 5 5 
5 4 6 7  5.67  6 4 5 7  5.33 
6 6 4 5 5 5 6 4 5 5 
7 5 5 8 6 5 5 5 6  5.33 
8 4 5 6 5 6 6 5 6  5.67 
9 6 5 6  5.67  5 5 5 6  5.33 
10  7 4 6  5.67  7 8 4 7  6.33 
11  7 5 5  5.67  7 7 6 6  6.33 
12  6 6 5  5.67  7 6 6 7  6.33 
13  7 5 4  5.33  6 6 6 6 6 
14  6 5 7 6 6 6 6 6 6 
15  4 6 3  4.33  6 5 6 9  6.67 
 
 
Table 10: Clustered Logit Regression: Sequenced IGI 
 
Dependent  variable:  safe=1,  risky=0        
Independent 
Variable 
Coefficient Clustered  Robust 
Standard Error 
Z p-value 
win percentage  -9.4698  1.6847  -5.62  0.000 
phase 2  9.7449  3.5107  2.78  0.006 
interaction -14.5928  5.2184  -2.80  0.005 
constant 5.5724  1.0357  5.38  0.000 
n = 600, McFadden’s pseudo R
2 = 0.5856 
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Figure 4: Logit Predicted Probabilities of Safe Lottery Choice:  
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Appendix: Lottery-Choice Instructions and Decision Sheets 
  
Group Decision Choice Experiment 
 
  The blue sheet of paper shows ten decisions.  Each decision is a paired choice between 
“Option A” and “Option B.”  Your group will make ten choices by circling the option in the box 
to the right of the options, but only one of them will be used in the end to determine your group’s 
earnings.  Group earnings will be equally shared between all group members.  Before your group 
starts making the ten choices, please let me explain how these choices will affect your group’s 
earnings and the group decision-making process.   
 
  Here is a ten-sided die that will be used to determine payoffs; the faces are numbered 
from 1 to 10 (the “0” face of the die will serve as 10).  After your group has made all of the 
choices, we will throw this die twice, once to select one of the ten decisions to be used, and a 
second time to determine what your group’s payoff is for the option you choose, A or B, for the 
particular decision selected.  Even though your group will make ten decisions, only one of these 
will end up affecting your earnings, but your group will not know in advance which decision will 
be used.  Obviously, each decision has an equal chance of being used in the end.     
 
  Now, please look at Decision 1 at the top.  Option A pays $60 if the throw of the die is 1, 
and it pays $48 if the throw is 2-10.  Option B yields $115.50 if the throw of the die is 1, and it 
pays $3 if the throw is 2-10.  The other decisions are similar, except that as you move down the 
table, the chances of the higher payoff for each Option increase.  In fact, for Decision 10 in the 
bottom row, the die will not be needed since each Option pays the highest payoff for sure, so your 
group’s choice here is between $60 and $115.50. 
 
  To summarize, your group will make ten choices:  for each decision row your group will 
have to choose between Option A and Option B.  Your group may choose A for some decision 
rows and B for other rows, and your group may change choices and make them in any order.  
Your group makes choices by circling “A” or “B” in the box next to the options for each decision.  
After your group has made all 10 choices, each member should sign on the second page of the 
Decision Sheet and please alert the experimenter to submit your group’s decisions. 
 
  After your group has submitted its decisions, we will throw the ten-sided die once to 
select which one of the ten Decisions will be used.  Then we will throw the die a second time to 
determine your group’s money earnings for the Option your group chose for that decision.  You 
will be paid all earnings in cash when we finish. 
 
  So now please look at the decisions on the blue sheet.  Your group will have to choose A 
or B for each of these decisions, and then the die throw will determine which one is going to 
count.  We will look at the decision that your group made for the choice that counts, and then the 
second die throw will determine your group’s earnings for this part.  The experimenter will then 
report your group’s earnings to you. 
 
Are there any questions?  Now turn to the following page and let me describe the group decision-
making process.       25
Group Decision-Making Process 
 
  Your group has 20 minutes to make choices for all ten decisions. Your group can reach a 
unanimous choice any way you choose.  To ensure that the group unanimously agrees on the 
choices, each group member will sign their name on the Lottery-Decision Sheet stating they agree 
to the choices on the sheet before they submit the sheet to the experimenter.  If your group cannot 
reach a unanimous choice for a particular decision, each group member will privately submit a 
choice, and the choice of the majority of group members will be the group choice for that 
decision. 
 
Are there any questions?  Now your group may begin making choices.  Please do not talk with 
anyone outside of your group while we are doing this; raise your hand if you have a question.   26
Individual 10X Lottery-Choice Decision Sheet 
 
ID:________                           Group:________ 
 
  








A or B  
Decision 1 
 
$20.00 if throw of die is 1 
$16.00 if throw of die is 2-10 
  
$38.50 if throw of die is 1 




$20.00 if throw of die is 1-2 
$16.00 if throw of die is 3-10 
 
 $38.50 if throw of die is 1-2 




$20.00 if throw of die is 1-3 
$16.00 if throw of die is 4-10 
  
$38.50 if throw of die is 1-3 




$20.00 if throw of die is 1-4 
$16.00 if throw of die is 5-10 
 
 $38.50 if throw of die is 1-4 




$20.00 if throw of die is 1-5 
$16.00 if throw of die is 6-10 
  
$38.50 if throw of die is 1-5 




$20.00 if throw of die is 1-6 
$16.00 if throw of die is 7-10 
 
 $38.50 if throw of die is 1-6 




$20.00 if throw of die is 1-7 
$16.00 if throw of die is 8-10 
 
 $38.50 if throw of die is 1-7 




$20.00 if throw of die is 1-8 
$16.00 if throw of die is 9-10 
  
$38.50 if throw of die is 1-8 




$20.00 if throw of die is 1-9 
$16.00 if throw of die is 10 
  
$38.50 if throw of die is 1-9 




$20.00 if throw of die is 1-10 
 
$38.50 if throw of die is 1-10   
 
  Decision used:_______ Die Throw:_______ Your earnings:_______   27
Group 10X Lottery-Choice Decision Sheet 
 
ID:________                           Group:________ 
 
  








A or B  
Decision 1 
 
$60.00 if throw of die is 1 
$48.00 if throw of die is 2-10 
  
$115.50 if throw of die is 1 




$60.00 if throw of die is 1-2 
$48.00 if throw of die is 3-10 
 
 $115.50 if throw of die is 1-2 




$60.00 if throw of die is 1-3 
$48.00 if throw of die is 4-10 
  
$115.50 if throw of die is 1-3 




$60.00 if throw of die is 1-4 
$48.00 if throw of die is 5-10 
 
 $115.50 if throw of die is 1-4 




$60.00 if throw of die is 1-5 
$48.00 if throw of die is 6-10 
  
$115.50 if throw of die is 1-5 




$60.00 if throw of die is 1-6 
$48.00 if throw of die is 7-10 
 
 $115.50 if throw of die is 1-6 




$60.00 if throw of die is 1-7 
$48.00 if throw of die is 8-10 
 
 $115.50 if throw of die is 1-7 




$60.00 if throw of die is 1-8 
$48.00 if throw of die is 9-10 
  
$115.50 if throw of die is 1-8 




$60.00 if throw of die is 1-9 
$48.00 if throw of die is 10 
  
$115.50 if throw of die is 1-9 




$60.00 if throw of die is 1-10 
 
$115.50 if throw of die is 1-10   
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Sequenced IGI Individual Lottery-Choice Decision Sheet 
 
ID:________                           Group:________ 
 
  








A or B  
Decision 1 
 
$2.00 if throw of die is 1 
$1.60 if throw of die is 2-10 
  
$3.85 if throw of die is 1 




$2.00 if throw of die is 1-2 
$1.60 if throw of die is 3-10 
 
 $3.85 if throw of die is 1-2 




$2.00 if throw of die is 1-3 
$1.60 if throw of die is 4-10 
  
$3.85 if throw of die is 1-3 




$2.00 if throw of die is 1-4 
$1.60 if throw of die is 5-10 
 
 $3.85 if throw of die is 1-4 




$2.00 if throw of die is 1-5 
$1.60 if throw of die is 6-10 
  
$3.85 if throw of die is 1-5 




$2.00 if throw of die is 1-6 
$1.60 if throw of die is 7-10 
 
 $3.85 if throw of die is 1-6 




$2.00 if throw of die is 1-7 
$1.60 if throw of die is 8-10 
 
 $3.85 if throw of die is 1-7 




$2.00 if throw of die is 1-8 
$1.60 if throw of die is 9-10 
  
$3.85 if throw of die is 1-8 




$2.00 if throw of die is 1-9 
$1.60 if throw of die is 10 
  
$3.85 if throw of die is 1-9 




$2.00 if throw of die is 1-10 
 
$3.85 if throw of die is 1-10   
 
  Decision used:_______ Die Throw:_______ Your earnings:_______ 
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Sequenced IGI Group Lottery-Choice Decision Sheet 
 
ID:________                           Group:________ 
 
  








A or B  
Decision 1 
 
$6.00 if throw of die is 1 
$4.80 if throw of die is 2-10 
  
$11.55 if throw of die is 1 




$6.00 if throw of die is 1-2 
$4.80 if throw of die is 3-10 
 
 $11.55 if throw of die is 1-2 




$6.00 if throw of die is 1-3 
$4.80 if throw of die is 4-10 
  
$11.55 if throw of die is 1-3 




$6.00 if throw of die is 1-4 
$4.80 if throw of die is 5-10 
 
 $11.55 if throw of die is 1-4 




$6.00 if throw of die is 1-5 
$4.80 if throw of die is 6-10 
  
$11.55 if throw of die is 1-5 




$6.00 if throw of die is 1-6 
$4.80 if throw of die is 7-10 
 
 $11.55 if throw of die is 1-6 




$6.00 if throw of die is 1-7 
$4.80 if throw of die is 8-10 
 
 $11.55 if throw of die is 1-7 




$6.00 if throw of die is 1-8 
$4.80 if throw of die is 9-10 
  
$11.55 if throw of die is 1-8 




$6.00 if throw of die is 1-9 
$4.80 if throw of die is 10 
  
$11.55 if throw of die is 1-9 




$6.00 if throw of die is 1-10 
 
$11.55 if throw of die is 1-10   
 
  Decision used:_______ Die Throw:_______ Your earnings:_______ 
 
 
 
 
 